# Routing and wavelength assignment in optical networks 

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## Optical nełworks

- Links: optical fibers
- Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM)
- several "channels" per fiber
- Routing
- Wavelength assignment


## Considerations in WDM networks

- Restrictions:
- requests using the same fiber must use different wavelengths (colors)
- wavelength continuity
- Limited availability of wavelengths


## Maximum profit path coloring

## Def. MaxPr-PC problem:

■ instance: graph $G$, path set $\mathcal{P}$, profits $w: \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathbb{Q}$, \# colors $k$

- solution: a $k$-colorable subset of paths $\mathcal{P}^{\prime} \subseteq \mathcal{P}$
- goal: maximize $w\left(\mathcal{P}^{\prime}\right)=\sum_{p \in P^{\prime}} w(p)$



## Outline of presentation

- Algorithms for MAxPr-PC in rings and experimental evaluation
- Non-cooperative routing and wavelength assignment in multifiber optical networks
- A neat application of path coloring to a transportation problem
- Conclusions


## Maximum profit path coloring

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Remarks:

- NP-hard in rings and trees
- polynomial-time solvable in chains (CL95)


## Related work

- MaxPr-PC with routing (BG09), $\rho=1.5$
- MaxPr-PC with routing and capacity constraints (LLWZO5), $\rho=2$
- Adaptation of iterative algorithm (WL98), $\rho \approx 1.58$
- LP + randomized rounding (Car07), w.h.p. $\rho \approx 1.49+\epsilon$


## Coming up...

- Match and replace
- a fast, combinatorial 2-approximation algorithm for MaxPr-PC in rings
- Tradeoffs between time efficiency and attained profit
- some experimental results

B, Pagourtzis, Potika: Maximum profit wavelength assignment in WDM rings. CTW 2008 (full version to appear in Networks).

## Match and replace

1. pick an edge $e$, and partition $\mathcal{P}$ into $\mathcal{P}_{e}$ and $\mathcal{P}_{c}$
2. color $\left\langle G, \mathcal{P}_{c}, w, k\right\rangle$ optimally (chain subinstance)
3. construct a weighted complete bipartite graph $H$ with nodes $\{1, \ldots, k\} \cup K$ ( $K$ : set of $k$ heaviest paths in $P_{e}$ )

- $w^{\prime}(i, q)=w(q)-w\left(\left[\mathcal{P}_{c}(i)\right]^{q}\right)$ (gain by picking $q \in \mathcal{P}_{e}$ instead of $\left.\left[\mathcal{P}_{c}(i)\right]^{q}\right)$

4. compute a maximum weight matching $M$ in $H$
5. for each $(i, q) \in M$
6. uncolor all paths in $\left[\mathcal{P}_{c}(i)\right]^{q}$ and color $q$ with $i$

## Match and replace (cont'd)



## Match and replace (cont'd)



## Match and replace (cont'd)

- $\mathrm{OPT} \leq \mathrm{OPT}_{e}+\mathrm{OPT}_{c}$
- We need to show that
- $\mathrm{OPT}_{c} \leq \mathrm{SOL}$ (easy!)
- $\mathrm{OPT}_{e} \leq \mathrm{SOL}$
- These imply $\mathrm{OPT} \leq 2 \mathrm{SOL}$
- Remains to prove:

$$
\mathrm{OPT}_{e}=w(K) \leq \mathrm{SOL}
$$

## Match and replace (cont'd)

The solution returned has total profit

$$
\mathrm{SOL}=\mathrm{SOL}_{c}+w^{\prime}(M)
$$

which can be written as


$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{SOL}=\sum_{i \text { not matched }} w\left(\mathcal{P}_{c}(i)\right)+w\left(K_{M}\right)+\sum_{(i, q) \in M} w\left(\left[\mathcal{P}_{c}(i)\right]^{\neg q}\right) \\
& \geq \sum_{i \text { not matched }} w\left(\mathcal{P}_{c}(i)\right)-\sum_{q \text { not matched }} w(q)+w(K) \geq \mathrm{OPT}_{e} .
\end{aligned}
$$

## Tight example



- Only one color
- $\frac{\mathrm{OPT}}{\text { SOL }}=\frac{2 a}{a+1} \longrightarrow 2$


## Alternatives for MaxPr-PC in rings

Algorithm Running time
Appr. guarantee

| Iterative | $O\left(k^{2} m^{2} \log m\right)$ | 1.58 |
| :--- | :--- | ---: |
| $\mathrm{M} \& \mathrm{R}$ | $O\left(m^{2}(k+\log m)\right)$ | 2 |

Greedy $\quad O(n m k+m \log m) \quad$ non-constant
"Best" $\quad O(k m \log m)$
2

## Experimental results: instance packs

50 randomly generated instances w.r.t. the following parameters:
■ $n$ : nodes

- m: \# requests
- $k$ : \# colors
- W: upper bound on profits
- mode of generation: uniform or gaussian: $\mu: \sigma$


## profit vs. \# paths ( $\mathrm{n}=100, \mathrm{k}=80$ )



## time vs. \# paths ( $\mathrm{n}=100, \mathrm{k}=80$ )



## Ranking of algorithms

| Algorithm | Attained profit | Approximation ratio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Iterative | $\star \star \star \star$ | 1.58 |
| Match-and-Replace | $\star \star \star \star$ | 2 |
| Greedy | $\star \star \star$ | non-constant |
| Best-Choice | $\star$ | 2 |
| Algorithm | Time efficiency | Time complexity |
| Greedy | $\star \star \star \star$ | $O(n m k)$ |
| Match-and-Replace | $\star \star \star$ | $O\left(m^{2}(k+\log m)\right)$ |
| Best-Choice | $\star \star \star$ | $O(k m \log m)$ |
| Iterative | $\star$ | $O\left(k^{2} m^{2} \log m\right)$ |

## Cardinality version

- All requests have the same weight
- Routed/unrouted requests
- Experimental results of the same flavor: iterative is best, closely followed by "Combine", simple greedy algorithm performs competently

B, Pagourtzis, Potika: Maximum request satisfaction in WDM rings: Algorithms and experiments. PCI 2007.

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Algorithms for MaxPr-PC in rings and experimental evaluation

- Non-cooperative routing and wavelength assignment in multifiber optical networks

A neat application of path coloring to a transportation problem

Conclusions

## Single vs multi-fiber



## Single vs multi-fiber


small color multiplicity $\Longrightarrow$ small \# fibers

## Non-cooperative model

- Large-scale networks: shortage of centralized control
- provide incentives for users to work for the social good
- Social good: minimize fiber multiplicity
- Reasonable policy: charge users according to the maximum fiber multiplicity incurred by their choice of frequency

B, Pagourtzis, Pierrakos, Potika: On a non-cooperative model for wavelength assignment in multifiber optical networks. ISAAC 2008 (LNCS vol. 5369).

## Non-cooperative model

- Large-scale networks: shortage of centralized control
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What will be the impact on social welfare if we allow users to act freely and selfishly?

B, Pagourtzis, Pierrakos, Potika: On a non-cooperative model for wavelength assignment in multifiber optical networks. ISAAC 2008 (LNCS vol. 5369).

## Problem formulation

Def. Path Multicoloring problem:

- input: graph $G(V, E)$, path set $\mathcal{P}, \#$ colors $k$
- solution: a coloring $c: \mathscr{P} \rightarrow W, W=\left\{a_{1}, \ldots, a_{k}\right\}$
- goal: minimize the maximum color multiplicity

$$
\mu_{\max } \triangleq \max _{e \in E, a \in W} \mu(e, a)
$$

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## Game-theoretic formulation

- Def. Given a graph $G$, path set $\mathcal{P}$ and $k$, define the game $\langle G, \mathcal{P}, k\rangle:$
- players: $p_{1}, \ldots, p_{|\mathcal{P}|} \in \mathcal{P}$
- strategies: each $p_{i}$ picks a color $c_{i} \in W$
- strategy profile: a vector $\vec{c}=\left(c_{1}, \ldots, c_{|\mathcal{P}|}\right)$
- disutility functions: $f_{i}(\vec{c})=\mu\left(p_{i}, c_{i}\right)$ (maximum multiplicity of $c_{i}$ along $p_{i}$ )
- social cost: $\operatorname{sc}(\vec{c}) \triangleq \mu_{\max }=\max _{e \in E, a \in W} \mu(e, a)$


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- social cost: $\operatorname{sc}(\vec{c}) \triangleq \mu_{\text {max }}=\max _{e \in E, a \in W} \mu(e, a)$
- Def. S-PMC: the class of all $\langle\boldsymbol{G}, \mathcal{P}, \boldsymbol{k}\rangle$ games


## Nash equilibria

- Def. A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player can reduce her disutility by changing strategy unilaterally:

$$
\forall p_{i} \in \mathcal{P}, \forall c_{i}^{\prime} \in W: f_{i}\left(\vec{c}_{-i} ; c_{i}\right) \leq f_{i}\left(\vec{c}_{-i} ; c_{i}^{\prime}\right)
$$



## Efficiency of Nash equilibria

- Def. The price of anarchy (PoA) of an S-PMC game:

$$
\operatorname{PoA}=\frac{\max _{\bar{c} \text { is } \operatorname{NE}} \operatorname{sc}(\vec{c})}{\mu_{\mathrm{OPT}}} \triangleq \frac{\hat{\mu}}{\mu_{\mathrm{OPT}}}
$$

- Def. The price of stability (PoS) of an S-PMC game:

$$
\operatorname{PoS}=\frac{\min _{\vec{c} i s \mathrm{NE}} \mathrm{Sc}(\vec{c})}{\mu_{\mathrm{OPT}}}
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$$

- Rate of convergence to some NE?
- by repeatedly changing some player's strategy to improve her disutility (Nash dynamics)


## Coming up...

- Convergence of Nash dynamics
- Efficient computation of Nash equilibria
- Upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy
- The price of anarchy on graphs of degree 2


## Related work

- Minimization problem with the $\mu_{\text {max }}$ objective (AZO4)
- Minimization problem with the $\sum_{e \in E} \max _{a \in W} \mu(e, a)$ objective (NPZO1)
- Bottleneck network games
- player cost: MAX of delays along her path
- players pick among several possible routings (BMO6)
- latency functions on edges (BO06)
- Congestion games (MS96, Ros73)


## Convergence to NE

Thm. Any Nash dynamics converges in at most $4^{|\mathcal{P}|}$ steps

- consider the vector

$$
\left(d_{L}(\vec{c}), d_{L-1}(\vec{c}), \ldots, d_{1}(\vec{c})\right)
$$

- lexicographic-order argument (attributed to Mehlhorn in (FKK ${ }^{+}$O2))
- $\operatorname{PoS}=1$


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- lexicographic-order argument (attributed to Mehlhorn in (FKK ${ }^{+}$O2))
- $\operatorname{PoS}=1$
- how many such vectors?

$$
\binom{|\mathcal{P}|+L-1}{|\mathcal{P}|} \leq 2^{|\mathcal{P}|+L-1}<4^{|\mathcal{P}|}
$$

## Efficient computation of optimal NE



- $\langle G, \mathcal{P}, k\rangle$ is in S-PMC(Rooted-Tree) if $\exists r$ s.t. each path in $\mathcal{P}$ lies entirely on some simple path from $r$ to a leaf
- consider edges in BFS order: color paths with min-multiplicity color in the partial solution


## A simple upper bound on the PoA

Thm. $\operatorname{PoA}(\langle G, \mathcal{P}, k\rangle) \leq k$
Proof.

$$
\operatorname{PoA}=\frac{\hat{\mu}}{\mu_{\mathrm{OPT}}} \leq \frac{\hat{\mu} k}{L} \leq k
$$

## A structural property of NE

- If $\vec{c}$ is a NE, then for any $p_{i} \in \mathcal{P}$ and for any $a \in W$ there is an $e \in p_{i}$ s.t. $\mu(e, a) \geq f_{i}(\vec{c})-1$
red-blocking edge for $p_{i}$

red-blocking paths for $p_{i}$


## An upper bound on the PoA

Thm. If $\vec{c}$ is a NE and $\operatorname{sc}(\vec{c})=f_{i}(\vec{c})=\hat{\mu}$ then $\operatorname{PoA} \leq \operatorname{len}\left(p_{i}\right)$ Proof.

- all $k$ colors are blocked along $p_{i}$
- some edge of $p_{i}$ must block at least $\left\lceil\frac{k}{\operatorname{len}\left(p_{i}\right)}\right\rceil$ colors
- max load is $L \geq 1+\left\lceil\frac{k}{\operatorname{len}\left(p_{i}\right)}\right\rceil(\hat{\mu}-1)$
- $\mu_{\mathrm{OPT}} \geq\left\lceil\frac{L}{k}\right\rceil$
- $\operatorname{PoA}=\frac{\hat{\mu}}{\mu_{\mathrm{OPT}}} \leq \frac{\hat{\mu}}{\left\lvert\, \frac{1+\left\lceil\left.\frac{\operatorname{len}^{\ln \left(p_{i}\right)}}{k} \right\rvert\, \hat{\mu}-1\right)}{}\right.} \leq \operatorname{len}\left(p_{i}\right)$


## A matching lower bound




## What about graphs with degree 2?

A more involved structural property:
$P\left(e, a_{i}\right)$ : the set of paths using edge $e$ that are colored with $a_{i}$.
Lem. In any NE of an S-PMC(RING) game, $\forall$ edge $e$ and $\forall a_{i}$ there is an arc s.t.:

- $\forall a_{j} \neq a_{i}$ the arc contains an edge which is an $a_{j}$-blocking edge for at least half of the paths in $P\left(e, a_{i}\right)$, and
- $\forall e^{\prime}$ in the $\operatorname{arc},\left|P\left(e^{\prime}, a_{i}\right) \cap P\left(e, a_{i}\right)\right| \geq\left\lceil\frac{\left|P\left(e, a_{i}\right)\right|}{2}\right\rceil$








## Establishing an edge with high load

Repeated application of the previous Lemma yields:
Lem. In every S-PMC(RING) game $\langle G, \mathcal{P}, k\rangle$ with $\hat{\mu} \geq k$ there is an edge with load at least $\frac{\hat{\mu} k}{4}$

## Establishing an edge with high load

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## Constant PoA for $L=\Omega\left(k^{2}\right)$

Thm. For any S-PMC(Ring: $L=\Omega\left(k^{2}\right)$ ) game, $\operatorname{PoA}=O(1)$
Proof.

- If $\hat{\mu} \geq k$, then $L \geq \frac{\hat{\mu} k}{4} \Rightarrow \mu_{\mathrm{OPT}} \geq \frac{\hat{\mu}}{4} \Rightarrow \mathrm{PoA} \leq 4$
- If $\hat{\mu}<k$, then:

$$
\operatorname{PoA}=\frac{\hat{\mu}}{\mu_{\mathrm{OPT}}} \leq \frac{\hat{\mu} k}{L}<\frac{k^{2}}{L}=O(1)
$$

## Unbounded PoA for $L=o\left(k^{2}\right)$

Thm. For any $\varepsilon>0$ there is an infinite family of S-PMC(ChAIN:
$L=\Theta\left(k^{2-\varepsilon}\right)$ ) games with $\operatorname{PoA}=\Omega\left(k^{\frac{\varepsilon}{2}}\right)$.

## Colored resource allocation games

- Players have access to a set of facilities $F$, each one available in $k$ different colors
- Each player $i$ picks some facility combination from $\mathcal{E}_{i} \subseteq 2^{F}$
- Each player must pick facilities of the same color

The last constraint nicely models the wavelength continuity
constraint

B, Pagourtzis, Pierrakos, Syrganis: Colored resource allocation games. CTW 2009.

## Various player costs

Def Colored congestion games

$$
C_{i}=\sum_{e \in E_{i}} n_{e, a_{i}}
$$

Def Colored bottleneck games

$$
C_{i}=\max _{e \in E_{i}} n_{e, a_{i}}
$$

## Various social costs

$$
\begin{gathered}
\mathrm{sc}_{\max }=\max _{i \in \mathcal{P}} C_{i} \\
\mathrm{sc}_{\mathrm{sum}}=\sum_{i \in \mathcal{P}} C_{i} \\
\mathrm{Sc}_{\mathrm{fib}}=\sum_{e \in F} \max _{a \in W} n_{e, a}
\end{gathered}
$$

## Price of anarchy bounds

| Social cost | Colored Congestion Games | Congestion Games |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathrm{sc}_{\text {max }}$ | $\Theta\left(\sqrt{\frac{N}{k}}\right)$ | $\Theta(\sqrt{N})$ |
| $\mathrm{Sc}_{\text {sum }}$ | $\frac{5}{2}$ | $\frac{5}{2}$ |
| $\mathrm{Sc}_{\text {fib }}$ | $\Theta(\sqrt{k \cdot\|F\|})$ | --- |
| Social cost | Colored Bottleneck Games | Bottleneck Games |
| $\mathrm{SC}_{\text {max }}$ | $\Theta\left(\frac{N}{k}\right)$ | $\Theta(N)$ |
| $\mathrm{Sc}_{\text {sum }}$ | $\Theta\left(\frac{N}{k}\right)$ | $\Theta(N)$ |
| $\mathrm{Sc}_{\text {fib }}$ | $\Theta\left(\frac{\left\|E_{\bar{A}}\right\|}{\left\|E_{A^{*}}\right\|} \frac{N}{k}\right)$ | --- |

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Conclusions

## Headway maximization



B, Kaouri, Lampis, Pagourtzis: Periodic Metro Scheduling. ATMOS 2006.

## Headway maximization



## Headway maximization



## Headway maximization



## Headway maximization



## Headway maximization (PMS)

Thm If a PMS instance admits a full collision schedule, then:

- A $k$-coloring yields a schedule with headway at least $\frac{T}{k}$
- A schedule with headway $h$ yields a $\left\lceil\frac{T}{h}\right\rceil$-coloring

Thm If a PMS instance admits a full collision schedule, then a $\rho$-approximate coloring yields a $\left(\frac{1}{\rho} \cdot \frac{L}{L+1}\right)$-approximate schedule.

## Conclusions

- Match and replace for MAxPR-PC in rings
- Selfish path multicoloring
- A framework for studying non-cooperative resource allocation in multifiber networks
- Applicability of path coloring models to a wide range of problems in networking/scheduling


## Other publications

E. Bampas, L. Gasieniec, R. Klasing, A. Kosowski, T. Radzik: Robustness of the rotor-router mechanism. OPODIS 2009 (to appear, LNCS).
E. Bampas, L. Gąsieniec, N. Hanusse, D. Ilcinkas, R. Klasing, A. Kosowski: Euler tour lock-in problem in the rotor-router model. DISC 2009 (†o appear, LNCS vol. 5805).
E. Bampas, A. Goebel, A. Pagourtzis, A. Tentes: On the connection between interval size functions and path counting. TAMC 2009 (LNCS vol. 5532).

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## Thank You!

